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Introduction: TAAS Industrial Corporate Security Awareness Programme 
(ICSAP) 
The oil and gas industry is a major component of the national critical infrastructure and as such 
represents an attractive target for terrorists. Globally terrorists have attacked every segment of 
the oil and gas fuel cycle, ranging from attacks on exploration and development sites, to maritime 
shipment, land-based distribution via pipelines, to retail and distribution networks, such as filling 
stations.[1] In addition to international terrorism, two major oil producing countries have also 
indicated to resort to the use of force in connection with the oil and gas industry:  
(a) Venezuela is threatening to destroy its installations on its oil fields in case of a military 
attack by the United States;[2] and  
(b) Iran has indicated it aims to "strike against U.S. interests all over the world" (note from 
authors: this includes U.S. oil and gas companies) "if the United States were to attack to 
Iran."[3]  
Therefore it will be necessary to engage in a proactive global strengthening of security in the oil 
and gas industry in order to reduce the risk of significant interruption in the energy production. As 
part of this effort TAAS has developed the Industrial Corporate Security Awareness Programme 
(ICSAP). In the following ICSAP is discussed in more detail and demonstrated in selected 
practically applicable examples.   
ICSAP Objectives and Modular Structure  
ICSAP has three major objectives:  
1. Integrated Threat Identification: ICSAP identifies multiple man-made threats for 
corporation and members of the management  
2. Comprehensive Risk Assessment: ICSAP enables corporate decision makers to assess 
the specific risk at the corporate and personal level  
3. Optimal Risk Management: ICSAP assists in the cost-efficient management of risks from 
internal and external threats.  
In order to tailor ICSAP to the specific requirements of the end-user it has a modular structure, 
with each of the three modules representing a self-contained unit. By implementing ICSAP a 
coherent Security Policy and Culture within all management levels of the organization will be 
achieved. 
Module 1 addresses Causation of Corporate Security Risks. In this module potential attackers 
representing a security risk to the corporation are identified for each site. In view of the mostly 
international operations of oil and gas companies it is important to develop a specific risk portfolio 
for each area, country and region the company operates in. Such a portfolio covers inter alia 
national terrorism, international terrorism, insider threat, organized crime, and cyber hackers. 
Furthermore, this module identifies also potential targets in seven asset categories of an oil or 
gas corporation: 
1. Major buildings (process units, on-site control rooms, corporate offices abroad, 
administration offices;  
2. Specific equipment of strategic value (product storage tanks, surge vessels, boilers, 
turbines, process heaters, sewer systems);  
3. Critical support systems (electrical power grid, natural gas supply lines, drinking water 
and process water supply, waste water treatment facilities);  
4. Inter-modal transportation and its interfaces (product loading areas and vehicles, railroad 
lines and railcars, pipelines supplying the facility, pipelines delivering products to outside 
of the plant, marine vessels and docking areas, offsite storage sites);  
5. Indispensable information technology components (SCADA software platforms for control 
of pipeline infrastructure, onsite computer networks, devices with remote maintenance 
ports, PDA, notebooks, and mobile phones of employees);  
6. Vital sectors of the retail sector (transport of refined products to petrochemical facilities, 
gasoline stations, and power stations; point of sale, such as bulk stations, gasoline 
stations); and  
7. Staff (technical experts in the field, top management, key administration officers).  
Module 2, which focuses on Management of Corporate Security Risks, prioritizes risks with risk 
defined as:  
R = p1 * p2 * C /E  
Where:  
• R = Risk to a specific oil and gas corporation due to a major terror attack  
• P1 = Probability of terrorists to possess all necessary means to carry out a particular 
terror attack  
• P2 = Probability for the successful implementation of a particular attack mode  
• C = Primary and secondary consequences of a specific mode of attack  
• E = Effectiveness of countermeasures during the emergency response phase.  
This module is implemented in five steps:  
1. Integrated threat and risk analysis for all seven asset categories identified in Module 1, 
i.e., from buildings to staff;  
2. Ranking of assets in terms of damage minimization and business continuity;  
3. Ranking of specific security vulnerabilities for the most valuable corporate assets;  
4. Scaling of risks in accordance with Table 1 below; and, 
5. Prioritization of cost-efficient security upgrades by using different security-optimization 
tools (Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE); Return on Investment (ROI); Control Analysis (CA); 
Optimized Mitigation Strategy (OMS).  
The use of such tools allows a cost-benefit consideration which leads to an increase of asset 
values for the whole organization. This increase in value can be communicated and considered 
for operational, marketing and financial use. Thereby this module contributes to mitigating 
casualties, minimizing damages to the corporate infrastructure, and restoring service to 
customers at the earliest time possible after a security-related incident. 
Module 3 identifies Corporate Responsibilities, addressing: 
1. Leadership, i.e., compliance with the legal environment (e.g., homeland security, data 
protection), implementing Corporate Security Culture and Security Policy (e.g., improving 
the human factor and its input in effective security and selecting technical and operational 
security measures to meet risk based performance standards);  
2. Crisis management, i.e., financial loss (damaged corporate assets; claims by third parties; 
legal fines for neglecting risks; increased insurance premium); reputational damage 
(customers, authorities, share holders); loss of market share (national, international); loss 
of key personnel and know-how; loss of trust by public;  
3. Business continuity, i.e. availability of key personnel (number, capability, motivation), 
access to operational redundancies (raw material supplies, buildings, production, 
transport, energy, water, communication), availability and support of First Responders 
(training, exercise, communication, and regular updates).  
Security Issues for a LNG Terminal  
In the following example selected parts of the ICSAP approach are demonstrated. It is assumed 
that the terrorist threat is a suicide boat attack on an LNG Terminal. A LNG Terminal represents 
an attractive target for terrorism due to the high energy density, large operational area, high 
degree of mobility (persons, traffic), and high media interest. 
The basis for the threat assumption are:  
1. In 2004 altogether 330 incidents were reported globally involving piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, of which over 110 happened against oil, gas, and petrochemical 
transport vessels;  
2. The existence of several chokepoints for maritime oil and gas transport, such as the 
Straits of Malacca, where 50,000 vessels pass through annually, carrying 66 percent of 
the global LNG to China, Japan, and South Korea.  
It is assumed that three high-speed boats, loaded with explosives (2000 kg TNT), ram the LNG 
tanker. Simultaneously additional terrorists attack the emergency response units approaching the 
scene of attack. During the attack the boats are driven against the vital parts of an LNG Terminal 
whilst LNG vessels are unloading their cargo. The attacking group consists of six terrorists 
motivated and trained as suicide attackers, receiving also insider support. The anticipated 
damage to be considered consists of primary damage (destruction of the LNG terminal, 
infrastructure and vessels present in the LNG terminal) and secondary damage (e.g., interruption 
of the supply chain, tightening of regulations, shut down of terminals by the government after 
massive media campaigns). 
This mode of attack has multiple consequences: 
1. Upon impact simultaneous rupture of two adjacent cargo tanks result in a spill 
(assumption: 200.000 m3 in max 1 min partially vaporized);  
2. At the pier vaporization and the existence of primary ignition sources leads to immediate 
ignition of vapour plume (temperature: > 1,600 C). This results in fatal thermal radiation 
(lower limit: 60 MJ/m2, h)[4] within a radius of fatalities due to thermal radiation up to 300 
m, respectively due to fatalities (blast energy) up to 3,000 m.  
Figure 1 shows the impact (overpressure iso-curves) of a suicide attack on an LNG tanker 
docked at a terminal. 
Figure 1: Structural damage (overpressure iso-curves) to an LNG tanker unloading at a 
terminal due to a terrorist attack using 60 kg of explosives 
 
According to the latest Sandia report, based upon the worst credible intentional or accidental 
event release of 200,000 m3 from two tanks of LNG, it was determined that a wind speed of 2 m/s 
resulted in the ‘worst case’ in which the flammable vapour cloud extended about 11.7 km 
downwind from the proposed offshore LNG Floating Storage and Regasification Unit.[5] The 
report determined 70,000 casualties could result from an offshore LNG tanker accident but none 
of the risk assessments even considered acts of sabotage or terrorism. A Lloyd's of London 
Insurance executive compared an LNG attack with a nuclear explosion.[6]  
Risk reduction measures are comprised of a wide spectrum of countermeasures such as 
(examples only): 
1. Lowering the probability of a suicide boat attack by adaptation of the threat assessment 
for an LNG port facility to include terror attacks and insider support, as well as application 
of the Onion Skin Principle, i.e., increasing layered security measures upon approach of 
the LNG tanker;  
2. Improving emergency response capabilities of first responders by providing armed 
protection for emergency crews in order to enable them to carry out their response action 
also in the presence of terrorist on land;  
3. Reducing Insider threat with a modular Security Culture Training Course for LNG-terminal 
staff members;  
4. Improving port security through strengthening of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code ISPS with realistic, practically applicable protocols.  
Table 1: Scaling of security risks  
Risk Factor 
   
Scale 
   
Volition 
   
Voluntary-involuntary 
   
Severity 
   
Ordinary-catastrophic 
   
Origin 
   
Natural-man made 
   
Effect manifestation 
   
Immediate-delayed 
   
Exposure pattern 
   
Continuous-discrete 
   
Controllability 
   
Controllable-uncontrollable 
   
Familiarity 
   
Common-new hazard 
   
Conclusions  
It is impossible to protect every component of the oil and gas fuel cycle against any potential 
security threat in a cost-efficient manner. The ICSAP approach offers a possibility to assess the 
various components of corporate risk, enable management to prioritize risk and identify corporate 
responsibilities. This provides the basis for a rational decision-making process, leading to a cost-
effective upgrading of currently available physical protection combined with strengthening of 
corporate security. Also ICSAP assists the oil and gas industry to communicate and demonstrate 
Security Culture and Policy in order to gain internal and public acceptance and respect for their 
safe and secure business and operation.  
About the Author 
P. Furthner is with TAAS Inc., Bad Voslau (Austria) and F. Steinhäusler is with the Division of 
Physics and Biophysics, University of Salzburg (Austria). 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
References  
1. See: F. Steinhäusler, P. Furthner, W. Heidegger, S. Rydell, L. Zaitseva, “Security Risks to the 
Oil and Gas Industry: Terrorist Capabilities,” Strategic Insights VII, no. 1 (February 2008) 
2. Statement by President Hugo Chavez as cited by Roger Howard, "Oil Price Warfare," The 
National Interest, September 2006, 85. 
3. Statement by Ayatollah Ali Khameni as cited by CNN International, February 8, 2007. 
4. 1 MJ = 948 British thermal units (BTU) 
5. See Tim Riley, "LNG Vapor Cloud Danger To Our Communities," on TimRileyLaw.com; and 
"Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)" on the website of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 
FERC.gov. 
6. This assertion, which is contested by industry experts, was made in a speech delivered by 
chairman Peter Levene to business leaders in Houston: "Gas carriers too, whether at sea or in 
ports, make obvious targets," said Levene. "Specialists reckon that a terrorist attack on an LNG 
tanker would have the force of a small nuclear explosion." (Mark Reynolds, "Lloyd's Executive 
Likens LNG Attack to Nuclear Explosion," The Providence Journal, September 20, 2004, archived 
online at EnergyBulletin.net.)  
 
